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Review Essay
Ethics of Mobility, Globalization, Political
Economy, and Culture
Refugees, Terror and Other Troubles with the Neighbors:
Against the Double Blackmail
Slavoj Žižek. Brooklyn, NY and London: Melville House, 2016.
127pp.

Edward Sankowski* and Betty J. Harris†
ŽIŽEK, A GOOD EUROPEAN
Slavoj Žižek’s Refugees, Terror and Other Troubles with the Neighbors-Against the
Double Blackmail is yet another book demonstrating Žižek’s ability to seize on major
contemporary social phenomena and to bring to bear on a topic, with provocative results,
his unusual combination of traits. He is very much a European educated by study and
travel into an especially vivid awareness of the connections of Western Europe (and the
UK), with Central and Eastern Europe (including his native Slovenia), and much of North
America. He has an expansive sense of being European that includes a sense of special
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kinship with historical and contemporary cultural extensions of Western Europe. He has as
well more distant but genuine sympathies with the oppressed in non-European-centered
cultures.
Obviously, Žižek thinks in global terms that comment on much more than
European problems in his body of work as a whole. But in this book the focus of attention
tends to return from farther-flung examples, outside Europe, to Europe. His general traits
(not geo-politically specific) need to be understood with his self-ascribed more Europeancentered qualities in mind. These traits include erudition, passion, a taste for popular
media, journalistic flair, gruff and sly humor, interest in the big picture, and an endlessly
productive willingness to speculate. But his intellectual and political personality cannot
truthfully be encapsulated in any list of virtues (real enough) or vices. The vices are also
real enough, such as repetitiveness, obscurity, reactionary impulses that arguably conflict
internally for him in regards to his renovated version of Marxism (a renovated Marxism
with some puzzling characteristics), willingness to tolerate huge risks for sizable human
populations in his political advocacy (whether those affected would agree to the risk or
not), frequent airy repudiation of “liberal democracy” but reliance on liberal democracy
and many of its characteristic accompanying ethical intuitions, “and so on, and so on,” as
he often says.
A perpetual traveler, a kind of immigrant or quasi-immigrant himself, liable to
pop up in print or on the screen in any number of settings around the world, Žižek here in
this 2016 monograph (as elsewhere) takes as his topic some issues arising from increasing
manifestations of human geo-political mobility (forced or voluntary). He is interested in
the background causes of the manifestations, and the consequences of mobility, especially
in cross-cultural interactions with political-economic implications.
More recently than the publication of Refugees, Žižek delivered a talk in Vienna,
on 20 May 2017, a talk which is available online, in which he comments about many of
the topics in Refugees. But that talk is not focused on this 2016 book, but rather looking
forward to and promoting still another forthcoming book. That talk was conjoined with
ruminations on other Žižekian topics such as atheism and love. 1 In another talk, at the
University of Ghent, arranged in concert with the Department of Philosophy at that
university, on 24 May 2017, Žižek also discusses related topics, e.g., “populist”
demonization of imaginary enemies, including racial and ethnic “Others.” 2 In this review
essay, while we critically discuss Refugees, we sometimes contextualize our discussion of

Ethics of Mobility 49
this book by calling attention to noteworthy connections between Refugees and other work
by Žižek.
In what follows, we do not try to reproduce the actual sequence of chapters in
Refugees. Rather, we aim to present and critically examine Žižek’s stance and some of the
main interconnected issues about that stance.

ŽIŽEK, EUROPE, REFUGEES, TERRORISM, NEIGHBORS
Refugees is difficult to summarize, or even to outline. Yet in our opinion, the book frames
topics and proposes a viewpoint that invites and admits of reconstruction, and amply repays
critical examination. We do not know if there is a unique conceptual map to be drawn about
Žižek’s thoughts in this book, but we do find it possible to sketch and critique one coherent
picture of what he is saying. This book is written as it were from the viewpoint of a rather
loyal though anxious and pessimistic European (but certainly with supplementary
interpretive references to the rest of the globe’s population as well, especially the excluded
and suffering billions outside some better-off areas). Žižek is primarily asking how Europe
should handle problems about refugees and terrorism that result because of people from
mostly distinct and separated cultures coming into proximity with one another and
engaging in transactions (often conflicts) of many different sorts. Refugees has, at times,
the dizzying comparative qualities that are present in some other excellent contemporary
philosophy and social science. 3 Such comparative work ranges over a wide variety of
societal contexts (present and past) for its sometimes startlingly juxtaposed comparisons
and contrasts. There can admittedly be disjointed aspects of some of the resulting texts
(including Refugees), and less continuous or at least less structured argumentative
exposition than one might expect in much other philosophical writing. Sometimes such a
text reads like a series of arresting passages of varying length only loosely moving in a
definite direction towards a definite conclusion. This Žižek book, like many another by this
author, has dense speculative passages, some persuasive, some not in their interpretive drift
and inferences. Some of the empirical claims are questionable, or at least would seem to
need a firmer basis in scientific method and evidence (possibly based on anthropological
fieldwork) than Žižek’s bold assertions. One example is Žižek’s claim that refugees too
often want the benefits of European liberal democracies but also the option to continue
with their traditional cultural practices in the societies such as Norway or Germany in
which they hope to settle (Žižek 2016: 61). How true is this? We do not know; neither does
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Žižek, though he asserts it. Žižek is on safer ground in raising the issue what refugees might
want, rather than asserting what they do want without evidence. As to some dense
speculative passages in Refugees, often not so much empirically questionable as of
questionable meaning altogether, that is the nature of some of Žižek’s work generally,
which can be both rewarding and frustrating in this respect. Possibly pushing at the
boundaries of thought in Žižek’s manner necessarily impels the thinker to some obscurity.
A more negative possibility is that some of his heroes such as Lacan are unreliable
resources. We nonetheless consider it very worthwhile for the reader to be patient in sorting
out what Žižek has to say.

MOBILITY AS CENTRAL TO GLOBAL CAPITALISM
Despite the difficulty in summarizing or outlining this book, one possible central and
complex idea (or set of ideas), part of the current Žižek viewpoint, can be discerned. Human
mobility (and corporate mobility is an aspect of this), border-crossing, as well as bordershifting, border-creation, and border-blurring, are to be anticipated as a continuing central
condition in contemporary life. 4 For Žižek, refugees, terror, (and weird, troubling, “creepy”
neighbors), are all to be expected under the circumstances of globalization, specifically
global capitalism. Weird neighbors are weird and “creepy” because we have difficulties
understanding what they desire (or relatedly their jouissance, a type of pleasure important
in Žižek’s theorizing, expressed in a concept difficult to decode, derived from Lacan); but
we do not understand what we desire either.5
Some of the major problems we face are environmental, though basic threats take
other forms as well. The most obvious other motivations for immigration or population
movements are military or quasi-military violence and economic pressures.
We need, Žižek says, to get used to a more plastic and nomadic way of life. After
some reflections on possible post-Fukushima-nuclear-incident scenarios in Japan, Žižek
generalizes:
The main lesson to be learned, therefore, is that human-kind should
get ready to live in a more “plastic” and nomadic way: local or global
changes in environment may result in the need for unheard-of large-scale
social transformations and population movements. We are all more or
less rooted in a particular way of life, protected by rights, but some
historical contingency may all of a sudden throw us into a situation in
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which we are compelled to reinvent the basic coordinates of our way of
life. (Žižek 2016: 110)
Žižek adds: “One thing is clear: in cases of such turmoil, national sovereignty will
have to be radically redefined and new levels of global cooperation invented”
(110). This is an interpretive conclusion towards which the book moves. 6
So this book emphasizes problems arising from personal and group mobility and
inter-cultural contacts within a global capitalist context. But the book also presupposes and
re-states more general views expressed previously by Žižek. He often designates four major
contemporary crisis areas: ecology; coping with the implications of intellectual property;
coping with the dimensions of biogenetics; and the antagonism between the Included and
the Excluded, which Žižek elsewhere and here describes in terms of many examples. The
examples include politically motivated walls; gated communities; slums; a global division
between comparatively prosperous parts of humanity living under comparatively peaceful
circumstances, and the rest (the majority of humankind), often living in hell; new forms of
apartheid (a word-concept obviously generated in South Africa, but morphing into
meanings about ever-changing, new forms of exclusion). 7

ŽIŽEK AND THE SUPPOSED NEED FOR CULTURAL COHERENCE
Our current situation, in Žižek’s account, has implications about much needed (more local
or national or geo-politically transnational, e.g., EU-wide) cultural coherence and related
political economy. And culture is interconnected with political economy, e.g., in the literal
sense that it translates into influential, real economy money-and-property transactions)
(Žižek 2016: 18–19). Nonetheless, Žižek acknowledges, indeed emphasizes that “culture”
is a problematic concept (and he is right about that point). But he notes that culture is
“emerging as our central life-world category” (Žižek 2016: 63–67). It seems that for Žižek
“culture” is often an “ideological” concept, better understood in more basic terms of
economic conflicts and class struggle. This is an unsurprising feature of Žižek’s Marxism.
Cultural coherence necessary to unify Europe, and to preserve and extend what is
best in European values and traditions (and there are analogies elsewhere in the world also)
will, according to Žižek, require some specification of and insistence on what should be
“the Leitkultur (the dominant culture),” i.e., “a positive emancipatory Leitkultur” (Žižek
2016: 108, 109). Substantial ethical and positive political economic improvements in the
globe as a whole will require moving beyond global capitalism. But clearly defining a
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viable alternative is not feasible currently, according to Žižek. Pessimism about our
prospects for decent conditions is plausible, on Žižek’s view. What seems like the light at
the end of the tunnel may be a train coming towards us, a formulation Žižek offers more
than once in his writings and talks (Žižek 2016: 115).
A viable and improved alternative to current global capitalism, according to
Žižek, would require forms of organization beyond liberal democracy. Liberal democracy
is failing, as periodic elections lose their genuinely legitimating function, as the welfare
state declines, and as liberal democracy runs the risks in many places of turning into
authoritarianism or neo-fascism. According to Žižek, we would also have to avoid (or
possibly to go beyond, if we are there already) authoritarian capitalism (which is a social
form making major gains, on Žižek’s view, notably in China). Elsewhere, Žižek has opined
that some forms of authoritarian capitalism arguably are beating the alliance of liberal
democracy with global capitalism at its own game.
Žižek’s reference to a Leitkultur or dominant culture is interesting and plausible,
but also highly problematic. He writes:
One has…to do two things: first, formulate a minimum set of norms that
are obligatory for everyone, without fear that they will appear
“Eurocentric”: religious freedoms, the protection of individual freedom
against group pressure, rights of women and so on; and second, within
these limits, unconditionally insist on the toleration of different ways of
life. And what if norms and communication don’t work? Then the force
of law should be applied in all its forms. (Žižek 2016:107)
What does this mean? Žižek seems to contrast “norms and communication” on the one
hand, and “the force of law” on the other hand. We need to ask, first, what, more clearly
put, are these norms, communication, and laws that are crucial for articulating a Leitkultur?
Who is formulating these norms (and associated communication), or the law, and for what
supposedly legitimate purposes? We need to take into account what are the reasons given
for or against the ideas proposed for a Leitkultur, and what are legitimate reasons here, and
why? So much is unanswered or unacknowledged here in Refugees, even allowing
charitably that Žižek is obviously not trying to state a complete and finished doctrine. Are
the norms etc. and/or law to be used in decisions about immigration policy? Probably that
is so, but how? Are the uses of the norms, etc. also, or perhaps primarily, intended to shape
conduct once (former) foreigners are present in a society? How? What if the one-time
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foreigners flout, or try to challenge or change the norms and laws of the receiving society?
Is it legitimate to try to avoid this in making immigration decisions about who should be
allowed in, or in deciding how to shape immigrant conduct, or in expulsions? How far
should “religious freedoms” and the other values mentioned by Žižek extend? Current
controversies in the U.S. show that what religious freedoms should warrant raises serious
questions. How would we resolve issues about “individual freedom and group pressure”?
These problems often arise when the education of the immigrant young, or parental
authority in general, are issues, as well as in many other contexts, such as norms about
marriage. Žižek must be aware of such types of questions, as his reference to unreasonable
objections in France to burkas implies, for example, and other passages (Žižek 2016: 108).
But his relatively brief references to the need for a Leitkultur offer almost no guidance on
the vast variety of such issues. At the same time, he is adamant about the importance of
some of the key issues:
…the crucial task of those fighting for emancipation today is towards a
positive emancipatory Leitkultur, which alone can sustain an authentic
coexistence and immixing of different cultures…If we make any
compromise here, if we are lost in pragmatic compromises, our lives are
not worth living. (Žižek 2016: 109)
This is passionately written, but settles nothing, nor does it undercut the need for pragmatic
compromises in some senses of what is pragmatic. Surely we need pragmatism to deal with
many of the questions. Perhaps Žižek has some vulgar meaning of pragmatism in mind, in
his rejection of pragmatism.
For Žižek, and his view is plausible, the refugee “crisis” as well as terrorism are
largely products of contemporary global capitalism. While economic justice is basic for
him, in this book he seems very interested in how to preserve what he regards as the best
in European traditions and culture. He is willing to run the risk of being accused (unfairly,
he would affirm) of Eurocentrism, and willing, up to a point, to risk being accused of
standing up for the aftermath of colonialism. He expresses disdain for what he considers
excessive attention in some quarters to the critique of Eurocentrism. According to Žižek,
given that many refugees bring with themselves their non-European cultures, there can be
many problems about migration into European countries of significant numbers of nonEuropeans; (he mentions early on particularly refugees from Africa and the Middle East)
(Žižek 2016: 4).
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SOME ASPECTS OF ŽIŽEK’S MARXISM
As a self-professed Marxist, for whom economics is basic, Žižek nonetheless, and
consistently, rejects the version of Marx that attributes a positive teleology to human
history, a version that claims that “history is on our side” (i.e., the side of genuine as
opposed to phony pseudo-progressive anti-capitalists). However, he claims that Marx
himself was very much a product of Europe at its best. (Yes, we would agree, but some of
Marx’s debt to European tendencies is highly questionable ethically! Think, e.g., of Marx’s
defense of supposedly progressive imperialism in India.) However, what remains of Marx
in Žižek’s version of Marxism is somewhat unclear, even accepting as clear enough Žižek’s
concerns about class struggle, and Žižek’s rejection of progressive teleology in human
history. A kind of “voluntarism” about possible societal progress is a part of Žižek’s own
version of Marxism. No “Big Other” (a favorite phrase in Žižek borrowed from Jacques
Lacan) will save humanity. There is no historical law that capitalism will end well. (In
other places, Žižek’s concept of the “Big Other” is different: it may be God, or “the
people,” etc.) If something better replaces global capitalism as we move into the future, it
will be because of “us.” (Is this “us,” for Žižek, the better sort of Europeans and their allies
or and/or converts to the best in European values among non-Europeans? we might ask).
Nonetheless, and Žižek emphasizes this, it is not clear at present what we should
do; “What Is To Be Done?” is a great question (to use Lenin’s phrase, as Žižek does).
Invention is necessary. Žižek seems increasingly pessimistic however this can be
successfully pursued. He does advocate the continuing relevance, with adjustments, of
“class struggle” (Žižek 2016: 117). In the present, Žižek often continues to practice the
critique of ideology (in some sense rather like the old idea of critique of false
consciousness). This is, indeed, his major activity.
ŽIŽEK: A DEARTH OF POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTAL THOUGHT?
But without some accompanying formulation of strategy and goals, and activism towards
positive developments, the critique of ideology is incomplete, as Žižek must know. Thus
in a discussion of problems about the globalization of agriculture and issues about food, he
remarks: “…we will have to invent new forms of large-scale collective action: neither the
standard state intervention nor the local self-organizations (so much praised by postmodern
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Leftists) can do the job” (Žižek 2016: 51). But he has little positive to propose in this
regard.
Žižek does refer elsewhere in the book to the problems of resettling large
populations of refugees, and suggests that Fredric Jameson’s idea of use of the military
deserves serious consideration:
So what is required in such a desperate situation? What should Europe
do? Fredric Jameson recently proposed the utopia of the global
militarization of society as a mode of emancipation: while the deadlocks
of global capitalism are more and more palpable, all the imagined
democratic-multitude-grassroots changes “from below” are ultimately
doomed to fail, so the only way to break the vicious cycle of global
capitalism is some kind of “militarization,” which is another name for
suspending the power of the self-regulating economy. Perhaps the
ongoing refugee crisis in Europe provides an opportunity to test this
option. (Žižek 2016: 105)
While the details of such ideas invite further critical study, the proposal is
sufficiently alarming (even Jameson uses that word) to warrant skepticism. In
another volume, Zizek and Jameson have joined forces (with comments from
others) to elaborate on this approach.8
Žižek currently lacks an adequate constructive vision, and this is bad (bad both
for Zizek and the world at large), because not only does Žižek have no plausible yet definite
strategy about what is to be done instrumentally, he does not have any clear or reasonable
(even if fuzzy) idea about what the goal of “Communism” is. Admittedly, Marx himself
was unclear about this. But in Žižek, more seriously than in his references to Jameson, a
series of puns about the “commons” (suggestive but not very definite) is mentioned as a
preferable substitute for what Žižek now says is anything living, justifiable, and yet
analogous to what should be learned from the “dead end” (as Žižek himself describes it in
various texts) of 20th century actually existing Communism.
ŽIŽEK AND THE RE-ASSESSMENT OF (ONCE) REALLY EXISTING
MARXIST REGIMES
Yet despite his protestations in denying this, Žižek evidently harbors not only some
admiration for Lenin, who also was obliged to improvise in his historical situation, but also
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perhaps a certain nostalgia for at least some features of 20 th century Communism. A more
positive way to read the extensive discussions of mostly defunct really existing socialism
in some of Žižek’s writings (not so much evident in Refugees, but not entirely absent in
spirit either) is that he sees a need for political philosophy and for normative (as well as for
descriptive) social science to revisit, and re-integrate an assessment of, the role of ideas
derived from an understanding of the experience of past really existing Central and Eastern
European Marxist regimes, in contemporary thought and activism. This has many
implications, of which one is the very live importance of understanding the example of
contemporary China, which Žižek is well aware of, but which (we think assuming a
debatable viewpoint) Žižek classifies as now embodying authoritarian capitalism.
However, Xi Jinping’s recent re-assertions of the continuing importance of Marxism in
China do not comport well with Žižek’s interpretation of the current Chinese reality as
mainly authoritarian capitalism.

ZIZEK AMBIVALENTLY INTERESTED IN THE POSSIBILITIES FOR
A GREAT LEADER?
Dangerously, Žižek may have a propensity, however muffled, for hoping for a Great
Leader, despite his rejection of the Big Other. In Žižek’s world-view, apparently Lenin was
great (though his project was headed for failure), but Stalin was not. That Leninism might
have laid the groundwork for Stalinism is somehow not to be dwelt on excessively in
Žižek’s exposition. Probably Žižek would be annoyed by this reminder. (We should add
that there really are annoying tendencies for critics of Marxist analysis and strategy to
accuse Marxism of a necessary tendency towards Stalinism).
Possibly, but this is not a definitely well-grounded claim by us, Žižek is fonder of
some more historically remote Great Leaders connected with supposedly historically
progressive causes (perhaps Robespierre is an example, as well as, for Žižek, Lenin). But
Žižek may well be skeptical or very negative about most contemporaries as possible Great
Leaders, especially those who embrace manifestly objectionable goals. (We might also
recollect Žižek’s put-downs in other writing of Nelson Mandela, to take one “progressive”
example). Žižek is witheringly critical of various more recent authoritarian leaders; in this
book, examples are Robert Mugabe, Vladimir Putin, Viktor Orbán, et al. Marine Le Pen, a
fledgling authoritarian party leader with a potential for achieving political power as a
rightist racist, is unsurprisingly criticized elsewhere by Žižek. But Žižek characteristically
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regards Emmanuel Macron, the man who defeated her in a French presidential election
conducted after the publication of Refugees, as a symptom of the sort of neoliberalism that
will continue to buoy Le Pen or generate her successors. Elsewhere,

Žižek had

prophetically criticized Silvio Berlusconi, warning that he represented a charismatic
political and plutocratic media-figure type whose time might well have arrived on the scene
in Western liberal democracies. (See the revised, updated paperback edition, Žižek 2011:
323–24).
We wonder whether Žižek’s repeated interest in supposedly heroic or mixed
monstrous-but-historically-influential

Great

Men

is

a

symptom of

something

unwholesome. To be fascinated by Stalin, Lenin, Mao, et al., some might think, could
enable a political analyst to derive insightful lessons about societal dynamics. But it might
also suggest too much of a tendency to conceptualize political issues from the viewpoint
or circumstances of the Great Man who could voluntarily bring about change. One might
compare this with the perhaps milder example of those U.S. Supreme Court watchers, e.g.,
lawyers or historians, who analyze issues of U.S. political morality to a substantial extent
by studying the personnel involved in (and the content of) Supreme Court decisions and
their circumstances. This perspective may not be the most fruitful for understanding
normative societal questions or undertaking processes of societal change. The perspective
may be helpful when conjoined with other, deeper perspectives. But there is no standard
recipe to grasp what is the best combination of perspectives about major societal decisionmaking. In the case of Žižek, and in particular with the issues in Refugees, one cannot fairly
accuse him of an obsession with the perspective of Great Men. The closest one could get
to justifying such an accusation is that he uses Lenin’s question, “What Is to Be Done?” as
the title of his concluding chapter, and refers to Lenin’s situation when depicting our need
to improvise politically and invent in contemporary circumstances (Žižek 2016: 115–16).
Perhaps what is more promising is remaining wary about any Great Decider, understanding
that there are no indispensable leaders, and exploring a variety of possibilities for choosing
our developmental direction. Žižek does at times suggest scorn about activism from below,
the grass-roots, as the cliché has it. However, we do not know what persons, groups,
cultures, or countries may devise initiatives that will contribute to the moral advance of
humanity. We may not need a “universal” largely unified struggle, which Žižek hopes for,
but rather varied struggles, some of which can be combined in unpredictable ways (not
always with neat consistency) to further emancipatory democratic development. As to
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cultures within a society, besides the question how they can live together, there are the
questions which cultures (or activism by other sets of like-minded inhabitants) can offer
distinctive projects to advance democracy, and what those projects can teach us. From this
perspective, differences and inconsistencies across cultures (or other groups) in a multicultural society are not necessarily best hastily reconciled with one another, but may
contribute through protracted conflict (if the conflict is productive, not outrageous and
seriously destructive). An overbearing Leitkultur might render such advances impossible.
Let’s consider next a central feature of Žižek’s outlook, his skepticism or outright rejection
of multi-culturalism.

ZIZEK AS A CRITIC OF MULTI-CULTURALISM (WITH FURTHER
APPLICATIONS SUGGESTED)
For Žižek, (and something similar could be affirmed of as different a thinker as Amartya
Sen, or a politician such as Angela Merkel) multi-culturalism is not a solution to the
contemporary problems (about refugees, immigrants, and minorities as such) with which
he is concerned. In Sen’s case, he is particularly critical of attempts in England to support
state-funded schools that nurture the preservation of Islamic religious education, as
contrasted with secular, “reason”-focused education. Sen seems to think such religious
schools separatist and divisive. However, Sen has a few kind words for U.S. multiculturalism as regards African-American culture (See Sen 2006: 115).
Multi-culturalism, in the versions Žižek criticizes, is said by him to have many
weaknesses and objectionable features. According to Žižek, it too often endorses the
preservation of core features of non-European cultures that are not societally consistent
with the best aspects of the mores of those European societies attractive to refugees (or
even attractive to voluntary immigrants as such). We would object that multi-culturalism
in other contexts, such as the U.S., has at its best sought to recognize and celebrate valuable
elements of the cultures of racial and ethnic minorities. At its best, such multi-culturalism
is not averse to the best in U.S. (or more generally “Western”) values. Nor does such multiculturalism at a reflective level necessarily repudiate the legitimate criticism of some
characteristics of minority cultures. To dismiss the vital goals of some multi-culturalism,
and to assume that some of its inessential and occasional flaws are necessary elements of
all multi-culturalism, as Žižek at times seems to do, and dismissively, seems to us to be a
major ethical and political error. The error in fact undermines what are some of the major
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strengths in European (and European-descended) traditions. Such dismissal also, and this
appears to be of major importance, seems to neglect or downplay the possibility that some
infusions from immigrant non-Western cultures might improve the value systems of some
Western countries. Without allowing for this genuine possibility, Žižek really is
objectionably Eurocentric.
Thus, a reasonably self-critical but assertive multi-culturalism need not fearfully
avoid the critique of some features of Islamic societies and cultures, need not yield to
accusers who denounce all such critique as Islamophobic. Such thoughtful multiculturalism, like Žižek, may (or may not) assert the importance of freedom of expression
even to the extent of supporting the publication of caricatures of a revered prophet.
Beyond a focus on multi-culturalism, other analogous topics and movements such
as anti-racism, feminism, and gay rights can often be (as Žižek would probably approve
of) linked with a focus on political-economic inequality and the need for an emancipatory
democratic project. These varied movements can to some extent make common cause in
emancipatory democratic activism from below. That suggests a rather different strategy
and set of tactics from Žižek’s, with his apparent attraction to more top-down foci. Topdown approaches may sometimes be promising or simply necessary, but without popular
initiatives, they are likely to fall short, or perhaps to fail disastrously.
ŽIŽEK-THE GOOD (EVEN BRILLIANT), THE BAD, AND THE DEFICIENT
We are grateful to Žižek for his adventuresome willingness to question boundaries and
challenge dogmas of many sorts, and this applies to his ideas about refugees, terror, and
trouble with the neighbors. He is capable of sharp critical observations about liberal
democracy and global capitalism. But, we think, he is not as capable of constructively
articulating alternatives (a criticism he seems at times to be tired of acknowledging and
even may tend to shrug off). We need not expect detailed blue-prints to hope for rough
sketches of a direction and approximate goals.
Žižek could also gain from greater appreciation of (but not mere nostalgic retreat
to) some of the disciplinary values (e.g., in philosophy and socio-cultural anthropology)
that he has profitably blurred. More seriously, Žižek could gain from an appreciation of
some of the ethical and political values he has often disparaged (such as multi-culturalism,
tolerance, anti-racism, and feminism), even some features of the traditions of liberalism
and liberal democracy, which in any case Žižek may often “relapse” into himself, as in his
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ambivalent attitudes about Bernie Sanders. Sanders gets good mentions in this book for his
willingness to communicate with ordinary folk (not to dismiss them as “white trash,” Žižek
says), folk who are troubled by globalization. Sanders, we would observe, is something of
a reversion in his proposed policies to New Deal advocacy, and in some cases Sanders has
pragmatically made common cause, whether justifiably or not, with politicians such as
Hillary Clinton, who is elsewhere much derided by Žižek (as a leader of an inherently
incoherent neoliberal coalition), and with the economist Jeffrey Sachs, hardly an author
radically critical of the foundations of global capitalism. 9
We do not deny, but affirm, that “liberal democracy” is in serious trouble, as Žižek
often repeats. We do not, however, as does Žižek, descend to denunciations of “Political
Correctness,” a rather empty and confusing phrase, better avoided as an attempt to express
an analytical category, better avoided in popular political rhetoric, whether one defends it
or attacks it. “Political Correctness” is a phrase that, in some uses in the U.S., has recently
in Trump terminology been used to refer to, e.g., a supposedly cowardly and perverse
unwillingness among some so-called “politically correct” Americans to attack the relatives
of terrorists; or more persistently in Trump’s case, an unwillingness (e.g., by some within
the judicial system) to engage in legalizing religious discrimination in immigration policy.

CONCLUSION
Žižek is pessimistic about the prospects for a successful emancipatory project that could
move beyond global capitalism and the liberal democracies that are subordinated to global
capitalism. Yet he thinks it is worthwhile to attempt to continue to develop the European
Marxist tradition to cope with major challenges of the contemporary world, particularly, in
this book, the challenges arising from human mobility and manifestations of exclusionary
societal phenomena, e.g., refugees, terrorism, and troubles with creepy neighbors. On his
view, a continuing focus on political economy is important, as is culture, but “culture” has
increasingly become a problematic part of political economy. On Žižek’s views about
“What Is to Be Done?,” articulation of a Leitkultur is central, and we should avoid forms
of multi-culturalism, supposed anti-racism, upper-middle-class feminism, repressive
tolerance, and liberalism (etc.) that seek to detach themselves from projects to overcome
major basic exclusionary (presumably highly inequitable) societal processes in the global
political economy. In our discussion, we have expressed our reservations about Žižek with
respect to these views.
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APPENDIX ON ŽIŽEK ON TRUMP
As we conclude this interpretation and critical evaluation of Žižek’s book, as set in the
broader context of Žižek’s ideas expressed in many places, we feel compelled to comment
also on a contextual point not explicitly referenced within the monograph: Žižek’s by now
notorious on-screen remark just prior to the 2016 U.S. presidential election that if he were
an American citizen he would vote for Donald Trump, not Hillary Clinton, that Clinton
supposedly was the “true danger,” and that Trump’s election might generate a great
awakening in the U.S. Subsequent events (like the previous U.S. campaign) suggest that
Žižek’s views were a serious error. Žižek has since partially back-pedaled from his earlier
remarks, now referring to Trump as vulgar and an idiot. Trump is, though not original in
this respect, a prototypical advocate of divisive walls and a proponent of ill-advised
immigration restrictions. He is also a would-be Great Leader, though this is dangerously
delusional. Though in his rhetoric an opponent of globalist sell-outs of working Americans,
Trump is in practice a shameless champion of self-interested international investments and
a proponent of policies that would increase the pace of ecological degradation. In Refugees,
as elsewhere, Žižek refers to the building of walls (of which Trump’s proposed wall
between Mexico and the U.S. is obviously a major example) in contemporary life as deeply
symbolic about our global plight. Indeed, in Refugees, recall that Žižek gives divisive walls
an especially important status among the four elements that he has often identified from
book to book and appearance to appearance as defining major signs of our “living in the
end times”.10 Trump’s sympathetic attitudes towards the likes of Putin and Le Pen, his
evocation of kind words from Robert Mugabe and his welcoming of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
of Turkey (whose bodyguards recently attacked protestors in Washington, DC on the
occasion of his visit with Trump), his apparent interests in cooperation with (and arms sales
to) Saudi Arabia, even his announced intention of withdrawal from the 2015 Paris
Agreement, might not surprise Žižek, but these and other features of the Trump
administration imply what a high price may be paid for any such great awakening as Žižek
imagined before the 2016 U.S. presidential election.
NOTES
1.

For that 20 May 2017 talk, see http://zizek.uk/slavoj-zizek-the-courage-ofhopelessness-may-2017/ (Accessed 8/1/17).

2.

See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dx1m_d_kOHI (Accessed 8/1/17).
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3.

See, for example, Appadurai (2013), which mostly focuses on improving the lot of
slum-dwellers in Mumbai, but also addresses more varied international issues.

4.

We might recollect “The World in Pieces: Culture and Politics at the End of the
Century,” an older anticipatory lecture/essay/chapter, addressing some of these
themes. That is by the socio-cultural anthropologist Clifford Geertz, about similar
topics, re-published in Geertz’s valuable collection, Available Light: Anthropological
Reflections on Philosophical Topics (2000).

5.

On jouissance, see, e.g., Refugees 81–83.

6.

Recent events in June, 2017 surrounding the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change
represent both a supposed attempt by the Trump administration to re-assert
sovereignty by beginning withdrawal from the agreement, and reactions by much of
the world against that attempt.

7.

Thus see Žižek 2016: 68 on Peter Sloterdijk, In the World Interior of Capital (2013).
Also, see Žižek 2016 on “serial killings of women in Ciudad Juarez at the border with
Texas” (35); “serial rapes and murders of aboriginal women in Western Canada, close
to reservations around Vancouver”, and reservations where the dead bodies are liable
to be placed after off-reservation atrocities (35); “Bantustans,” “territories set aside for
black inhabitants” in formal-apartheid South Africa (78–79); the conditions in the
West Bank (79).

8.

Fredric Jameson 2016, edited by Slavoj Žižek. For an online discussion of Jameson’s
proposals for “An American Utopia,” see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M
NVKoX40ZAo, a discussion by Jameson with Stanley Aronowitz at the Graduate
Center of the City University of New York on 3/29/14 (Accessed 8/1/17).

9.

See, for example, Sanders’s Foreword to Jeffrey Sachs 2017. It should be noted that
Sachs has become far more critical more recently than in his early-2017 book of the
American political economy. See “America’s Broken Democracy”: https: //www.
project-syndicate.org/ commentary/ trump-political-masters-koch-brothers-by-jeffrey
-d-sachs-2017-05) (Accessed 8/1/17).

10. See Žižek 2010: x, for one variation on this scheme; and Žižek 2016: 113.
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